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This paper constructs a theory of the coexistence of fixed-term and permanent employment 
contracts in an environment with ex-ante identical workers and employers. Workers under 
fixed-term contracts can be dismissed at no cost while permanent employees enjoy labor 
protection. In a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, firms find 
optimal to discriminate by offering some workers a fixed-term contract while offering other 
workers a permanent contract. Match-specific quality between a worker and a firm determines 
the type of contract offered. We analytically characterize the firm’s hiring and firing rules. 
Using matched employer-employee data from Canada, we estimate the wage equations from 
the model. The effects of firing costs on wage inequality vary dramatically depending on 
whether search externalities are taken or not into account. 
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The existence of two-tiered labor markets in which workers are segmented by the degree
of job protection they enjoy is typical in many OECD countries. Some workers, which one
could label temporary (or ﬁxed-term) workers, enjoy little or no protection. They are paid
relatively low wages, experience high turnover, and transit among jobs at relatively high
rates. Meanwhile, other workers enjoy positions where at dismissal the employer faces a
ﬁring tax or a statutory severance payment. These workers’ jobs are more stable; they are
less prone to being ﬁred, and are paid relatively higher wages. The menu and structure
of available contracts is oftentimes given by an institutional background who seeks some
policy objective . Workers and employers, however, can choose from that menu and agree
on the type of relationship they want to enter.
This paper examines the conditions under which ﬁrms and workers decide to enter
either a permanent or a temporary relationship. Intuitively ﬁrms should always opt for
oﬀering workers the contract in which dismissal is free, not to have their hands tied in
case the worker under-performs. We construct a theory, however, in which match-quality
between a ﬁrm and a worker determines the type of contract chosen. By match quality
we mean the component of a worker’s productivity that remains ﬁxed as long as the
ﬁrm and the worker do not separate and that is revealed at the time the ﬁrm and the
worker meet. Firms oﬀer workers with low match-quality a ﬁxed-term contract, which
can be terminated at no cost after one period and features a relatively low wage. If it is
not terminated, the ﬁrm agrees to promote the worker and upgrade the contract into a
permanent one, which features a higher wage and it is relatively protected by a ﬁring tax.
Firms ﬁnd optimal to oﬀer high-quality matches a permanent contract because temporary
workers search on the job. Facing the risk of losing a good worker, the ﬁrm ties its hands
promising to pay the tax in case of termination and remunerating the worker with a
higher wage. Endogenous destruction of matches, both permanent and temporary, arises
from changes in a time-varying component of a worker’s productivity: if these changes
are negative enough, they force ﬁrms to end relationships.
Our set-up is tractable enough to allow us to characterize three cut-oﬀ rules. First, we
show that there exists a cut-oﬀ point in the distribution of match-speciﬁc shocks above
which the ﬁrm oﬀers a permanent contract, and below which the ﬁrm oﬀers a temporary
contract. There is also a cut-oﬀ point in the distribution of the time-varying component
of productivity below which the relationship between a temporary worker and a ﬁrm ends
2and above which it continues. Finally, we show the existence of a cut-oﬀ point also in the
distribution of the time-varying component of productivity below which the relationship
between a permanent worker and a ﬁrm ends and above which it continues.
Naturally, workers stay longer in jobs for which they constitute a good-match. Per-
manent workers enjoy stability and higher pay. Temporary workers on the other hand
experience high job-to-job transition rates in lower-paid jobs while they search for better
opportunities. We emphasize that our theory delivers all of these results endogenously.
The paper does not examine the social or policy goals that lead some societies to
establish ﬁring costs or to regulate to some degree the relationships between workers
and employers. Rather, we build a framework in which the menu of possible contracts
is given by an institutional background that we do not model explicitly. We then use
this framework to evaluate under what conditions employers and workers enter in to
temporary or permanent relationships. Not addressing the reasons for why governments
introduce ﬁring costs does not preclude us from making positive statements about the
eﬀects of changing those ﬁring policies. This is precisely the goal of the second part of the
paper: to quantitatively evaluate how the existence of ﬁring costs helps shape the wage
distribution. To perform this quantitative evaluation, we apply the theory to the economy
of Canada. We choose to study the Canadian economy for two reasons. First, it has a rich
enough dataset that allows us to distinguish workers by type of contract. Second, it is an
economy with a signiﬁcant amount of temporary workers who represent 14% of the total
workforce. We use the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES), a matched employer-
employee dataset, to link wages of workers to average labor productivities of the ﬁrms
that employ them. This relationship, together with aggregate measures of turnover for
permanent and temporary workers also obtained from the WES, forms the basis for our
structural estimation procedure. We employ a simulated method of moments - indirect
inference approach to structurally estimate the parameters of the model. The method uses
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) that
overcomes computational diﬃculties often encountered in simulation-based estimation.
Having estimated the vector of structural parameters, we use the model to assess the
impact of ﬁring costs on income inequality. We ﬁnd that this impact greatly depends on
whether one allows the level of labor market tightness to vary with the policy change or
not. If the ins and outs of unemployment into employment, and vice-versa, do not change
the job-ﬁnding and job-ﬁlling probabilities, inequality rises substantially. The reason for
this rise is twofold. On the one hand, the relative wage of an average permanent worker
3rises relative to that of an average temporary worker. This is caused by the ﬁrm wanting
to hire more productive permanent workers to lower the probability of having to ﬁre them
and pay the higher ﬁring cost. On the other hand, the increase in ﬁring costs causes the
fraction of temporary workers to rise because they are relatively less expensive. However,
if the degree of labor market tightness is allowed to adjust, the fraction of temporary
workers falls because there are fewer upgrades of temporary contracts into permanent
contracts (i.e. there are fewer promotions). The higher ratio of permanent to temporary
wages still obtains, but the lower fraction of temporary workers lowers the variance of the
wage distribution. The result is that increasing the ﬁring costs has a very small eﬀect on
inequality.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature lacks a theory of the existence of two-tiered
labor markets in which some some worker-ﬁrm pairs begin relationships on a temporary
basis and other worker-ﬁrm pairs on a permanent basis.1 Again, by temporary and per-
manent relationships we have something speciﬁc in mind; namely contracts with diﬀerent
degrees of labor protection. Our study is not the ﬁrst one that analyzes this question
within a theoretical or quantitative framework, so by theory we mean not assuming an
ex-ante segmentation of a labor market into temporary workers or permanent workers.
This segmentation can occur for a variety of reasons: related to technology (e.g. assuming
that workers under diﬀerent contracts are diﬀerent factors in the production function);
due to preferences - assuming that workers value being under a permanent contract dif-
ferently than being under a temporary contract), or that they are subject to diﬀerent
market frictions. There are several examples which feature such an assumption: Wasmer
(1999), Alonso-Borrego, Galdón-Sánchez, and Fernández-Villaverde (2006), or Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (1992). Blanchard and Landier (2002) take a slightly diﬀerent route, as-
sociating temporary contracts with entry-level positions: a worker begins a relationship
with a ﬁrm in a job with a low level of productivity. After some time, the worker reveals
her true - perpetual - productivity level.2 If such level is high enough, the ﬁrm will retain
the worker oﬀering her a contract with job security.3 Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002)
1In the data, many workers that meet a ﬁrm for the ﬁrst time are hired under a permanent contract.
2Faccini (2009) also motivates the existence of temporary contracts as a screening device. In his work,
as in Blanchard and Landier, all relationships between workers and ﬁrms begin as temporary.
3A theory somewhat related to ours is due to Smith (2007). In a model with spatially segmented
labor markets, it is costly for ﬁrms to re-visit a market to hire workers. This leads ﬁrms to hire for short
periods of time if they expect the pool of workers to improve shortly and to hire for longer time periods if
the quality of workers currently in a market is high. He equates a commitment by a ﬁrm to never revisit
a market, as permanent duration employment. The route we take is to specify a set of contracts that
resemble arrangements observed in many economies and ask when do employers and workers choose one
4construct a search and matching framework to analyze the impact on several aggregates
of changing ﬁring costs. Their concept of temporary and permanent workers is similar
to the one used here. However, it is the government that determines randomly what
contracts are permanent and which are temporary. In other words, the fraction of tem-
porary worker is itself a policy parameter. That model is unable to answer why these two
contracts can co-exist in a world with ex-ante identical agents. The fraction of temporary
workers ought to be an endogenous outcome and this endogeneity should be a necessary
ingredient in any model that analyzes policies in dual labor markets. In the development
literature, Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009) construct a similar approach to analyzing
informal versus formal labor markets.4
None of the studies mentioned in this summary of the literature is concerned with
building a theory that explains why ﬁrms and workers begin both temporary and perma-
nent relationships and analyzing policy changes once that framework has been built. We
build such a theory, estimate its parameters and analyze its policy implications for wage
inequality in the subsequent sections.
2 Economic Environment
We assume an labor market populated by a unit mass of ex-ante identical workers. These
workers can be either employed or unemployed as a result of being ﬁred and hired by ﬁrms.
The mass of ﬁrms is potentially inﬁnite. Unemployed workers search for jobs and ﬁrms
search for workers. A technology to be speciﬁed below determines the number of pairwise
meetings between employers and workers. We depart from standard search and matching
models of labor markets (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) by assuming that two
types of contracts are available. The ﬁrst type - which we label a permanent contract -
has no predetermined length, but we maintain, however, the typical assumption of wage
renegotiation at the beginning of each period. Separating from this kind of contract is
costly. If a ﬁrm and a worker under a permanent contract separate, ﬁrms pay a ﬁring tax
f that is rebated to all workers as a lump-sum transfer τ. The second type of contract - a
temporary contract - has a predetermined length of one period. Once that period is over,
arrangement over another.
4There is a related branch of the literature that looks at the eﬀect of increasing ﬁring taxes on
job creation, job destruction and productivity. An example is Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). They
ﬁnd large welfare losses of labor protection policies as they interfere with labor reallocation from high
productivity ﬁrms to low productivity ﬁrms. Other examples would be Bentolila and Bertola (1990) or
Álvarez and Veracierto (2000,2006).
5the employer can ﬁre the worker at no cost. If the ﬁrm and the worker decide to continue
the relationship, the temporary contract is upgraded to a permanent one. This upgrade
- which one could label a promotion costs the ﬁrm a small fee c.
The production technology is the same for the two types of contracts. If a ﬁrm hires
worker i, the match yields zi + yi,t units of output in period t. The random variable
z represents match-quality: a time-invariant - while the match lasts - component of a
worker’s productivity which is revealed at the time of the meeting. In our theory, the
degree of match-quality determines the type of contract agreed upon by the ﬁrm and the
worker. This match-speciﬁc shock is drawn from a distribution G(z). The time-varying
component yi,t is drawn every period from a distribution F(y) and it is responsible for
endogenous separations. From our notation, it should be clear to the reader that both
shocks are independent across agents and time. The supports of the distributions of both
types of shocks are given by [ymin,ymax] and [zmin,zmax] and we will assume throughout
that ymin < ymax − c − f
A matching technology determines the number of pairwise meetings between workers
and employers. This technology displays constant returns to scale and implies a job-
ﬁnding probability αw(θ) and a vacancy-ﬁlling probability αf(θ). which are both functions
of market tightness θ. The job-ﬁnding and job-ﬁlling rates satisfy the following conditions:
αw′(θ) > 0, αf′ (θ) < 0 and αw (θ) = θαf (θ). The market tightness is deﬁned as the ratio
of the number of vacancies to number of workers searching for jobs. Every time a ﬁrm
decides to post a vacancy, it must pay a cost k per vacancy posted. If a ﬁrm and a worker
meet, z is revealed and observed by both parties. The realization of y, however, occurs
after the worker and the ﬁrm have agreed on a match and begun their relationship.
Let us ﬁrst ﬁx some additional notation:
• Q : Value of a vacancy.
• U : Value of being unemployed.
• V P : Value of being employed under a permanent contract.
• V R : Value of being employed following promotion from a temporary position to a
permanent one.
• V T : Value of being employed under a temporary contract.
• JP : Value of a ﬁlled job under a permanent contract.
6• JR : Value of a ﬁlled job that in the previous period was temporary and has been
converted to permanent.
• JT : Value of a ﬁlled job under a temporary contract.




P (y,z) ≥ EyJ
T (y,z)
 
the set of realizations of z for which the ﬁrm prefers to oﬀer a permanent contract. For





1 z ∈ A,
0 z / ∈ A.
We now turn to deﬁne some recursive relationships that must hold between asset values
of vacant jobs, ﬁlled jobs, and employment and unemployment states. Let us begin by
describing the law of motion for the asset value of a vacancy:

















This equation simply states that the value of a vacant position is the expected payoﬀ
from that vacancy net of posting costs k. Both workers and ﬁrms discount expected payoﬀs
with a factor β. The ﬁrm forecasts that with probability αf(θ), the vacant position gets
matched to a worker, turning the vacancy into either a permanent job, or a temporary
job, depending on the realization of the match-speciﬁc shock.5 With probability 1−αf(θ)
the vacant position meets no worker and the continuation value for the ﬁrm is having that
position vacant. The following equation states the value of being unemployed as the sum
5In principle the vacancy could remain unﬁlled if the value of the match-speciﬁc shock is low. Speciﬁ-
cally, for a ﬁrm and a worker to match, the drawn value of z must be greater than b−E(y), where b is the
unemployment beneﬁt. This should not be obvious to the reader at this point, but it will be once we reach
equation (15). To avoid notational clutter we eliminate the possibility of meetings left un-matched when
we describe the model economy and we impose z > b−E(y) in our estimation procedure. Consequently,
all meetings turn into matches. Modifying our setup to allow for the possibility of certain meetings left
unmatched is straightforward.
7of the ﬂow from unemployment beneﬁts b and the lump-sum transfer τ plus the discounted
value of either being matched to an un-ﬁlled job - which happens with probability αw(θ)
- or remaining unemployed.










+β (1 − α
w (θ))U, (2)
We now turn to describing the value of being employed which will depend on the type of
contract agreed upon between the worker and the ﬁrm. In other words, the value of being
employed under a permanent contract diﬀers from being employed under a temporary
contract. We begin by describing the evolution of V P, the value being employed under a
permanent contract, given by:
V
P (y,z) = w









The ﬂow value of being employed under a permanent contract is a wage wP(y,z); the
discounted continuation value is the maximum of quitting and becoming unemployed or
remaining in the relationship. As the match-speciﬁc shock is time-invariant, only changes
in the time-varying productivity drive separations and changes in the wage. However,
note that the ﬁring decision occurs before production can even take place: the realization
of y that determines the wage is not the realization of y that determines the continuation
of the relationship.
The worker employed under a temporary contract earns wT(y,z). At the end of the
period, she searches for alternative employment. The job ﬁnding probability the worker
faces is the same as that faced by the unemployed. Should the temporary worker not ﬁnd
a job, she faces the promotion decision after her new productivity level is revealed. She
becomes unemployed if her realization of y falls below a threshold to be deﬁned later.
Formally,
V
T (y,z) = w




















8After earning wT(y,z) for one period, conditional on her time-varying productivity not
being too low, the worker has a chance of being “promoted”. This promotion costs the
ﬁrm c and earns the worker a larger salary wR(y,z). This salary is not at the level of
wP(y,z), as the ﬁrm has to face the cost c, but it is higher than wT(y,z). The worker
earns this higher salary for one period, and as long as she does not separate from the ﬁrm,
she will earn wP(y,z) in subsequent periods. Consequently, the value of a just-promoted
worker evolves as,
V
R (y,z) = w









Regarding capital values of ﬁlled positions, the ﬂow proﬁt for a ﬁrm is given by the
total productivity of the worker, y + z, net of the wage paid. This wage is contingent on
the type of contract the worker is under. In the case of a just-promoted worker, the ﬁrm
must pay a cost c to change the contract from temporary to permanent. The asset values
of ﬁlled jobs under permanent, promoted, and temporary contracts are given by,
J
P (y,z) = y + z − w










R (y,z) = y + z − w










T (y,z) = y + z − w












Using the deﬁnition of IA, the value of a vacancy, equation (1) can be re-written as:
















So far we have been silent about wage determination. Following much of the search and
matching literature we assume that upon meeting, ﬁrms and workers Nash-bargain over
the total surplus of the match. Clearly, the sizes of the surpluses will vary depending on
whether the worker and the ﬁrm agree on a temporary contract or a permanent contract.
9We assume that workers and ﬁrms compute the sizes of the diﬀerent surpluses and choose
the largest one as long as it is positive. Since we have three diﬀerent value functions for
workers and ﬁrms, we have three diﬀerent surpluses depending on the choices faced by
employers and workers.
Denoting by φ the bargaining power of workers, the corresponding total surpluses for
each type of contract are given by:
S
P (y,z) = J
P (y,z) − (Q − f) + V
P (y,z) − U,
S
R (y,z) = J
R (y,z) − Q + V
R (y,z) − U,
S
T (y,z) = J
T (y,z) − Q + V
T (y,z) − U.
As a result of the bargaining assumption, surpluses satisfy the following splitting rules:
S
P (y,z) =
JP (y,z) − Q + f
1 − φ
=





JR (y,z) − Q
1 − φ
=





JT (y,z) − Q
1 − φ
=
V T (y,z) − U
φ
.
Free entry of ﬁrms takes place until any rents associated with vacancy creation are
exhausted, which in turn implies an equilibrium value of a vacancy Q equal to zero.













The interpretation of this equation is that ﬁrms expect a return equal to the right-
hand-side of the expression, to justify paying k.Combining equation (9) with the free










k + βαf (θ) G (A)f
(1 − φ)βαf (θ)
, (11)
where  G (A) is the probability measure of A. Equation (11) says that the expected
surplus - before ﬁrms and workers meet - is equal to the sum of two components. The ﬁrst
component, given by k
(1−φ)βαf(θ), is the expected value of a ﬁlled job divided by (1 − φ).
This is another way of rewriting the surplus in a model with no ﬁring costs and obtains
in other models of search and matching in labor markets. The introduction of ﬁring costs
implies the total surplus needs to include the second component,
k+βαf(θ) G(A)f
(1−φ)βαf(θ) . This is the
“compensation” to the ﬁrm for hiring a permanent worker - which occurs with probability
αf(θ) G(A) and having to pay the ﬁring cost f. Using this relationship together with
equation (10) to substitute into equation (2), one can rewrite an expression for the value





b + τ +
φαw (θ)
 
k + βαf (θ) G (A)f
 
(1 − φ)αf (θ)
 
. (12)
The value of unemployment can be decomposed into two components: a ﬂow value
represented by b + τ and an option value represented by the large fraction on the right-
hand-side. Closer inspection facilitates the interpretation of that option value. Note that
the expected surplus given by equation (11) equals this option value divided by φαw(θ).
The worker, by being unemployed and searching, has the chance of ﬁnding a job, which
happens with probability αw(θ), and obtaining a share φ of the expected surplus of that
match.
Substituting equation (12) into equations (3)-(8) and using (10), yields the following
convenient form of rewriting the surpluses under diﬀerent contracts.
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(1 − φ)αf (θ)
, (13)
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(1 − φ)αf (θ)
, (14)
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dF (x) − b. (15)
In all three cases the continuation values for the surpluses are bounded below by zero.
They cannot be negative because were the drawn value of y to imply a negative surplus,
workers and ﬁrms would separate before production took place. Proposition 1 shows the
existence of these values of y - conditional on the type of contract and the match-speciﬁc
quality of the match - such that the relationship between a worker and a ﬁrm ends. Before
stating that proposition we assume the following:
Assumption 1 Suppose θ is bounded and belongs to [θmin,θmax], i.e., 0 ≤ αw (θmin) <
αw (θmax) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ αf (θmax) < αf (θmin) ≤ 1. The following inequalities hold for
exogenous parameters:








θmink − (1 − β)f > ymin + zmax + β
  ymax
ymin
(1 − F (x))dx (17)
Assumption 2 In addition,




w (θmax)f) − (1 − β)f. (18)
12Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, for any z, there exists an unique cut-oﬀ value
yP (z) ∈ (ymin,ymax) and such that SP  
yP (z),z
 
= 0. If Assumption 2 also holds then
the unique cut-oﬀ value yR (z) ∈ (ymin,ymax) exists where SR  
yR(z),z
 
= 0. The cut-oﬀ
values solve the following equations: 6
y
P + z + β
  ymax
yP
(1 − F (x))dx = b − (1 − β)f +
φαw (θ)
 
k + βαf (θ) G (A)f
 




P + c + f =y
R. (20)
Proposition 2 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a cut-oﬀ point ¯ z above which
a ﬁrm and a worker begin a permanent relationship.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique cut-oﬀ value ¯ z ∈ [zmin,zmax] such that when z > ¯ z
the ﬁrm only oﬀers a permanent contract, while z < ¯ z, only temporary contract is oﬀered
if the following conditions hold:
β
   ymax
yP(zmin)




























   ymax
yP(zmax)




(1 − F (x))dx
 
(22)
To obtain expressions for wages paid under diﬀerent contracts we can substitute the
6Proofs for all propositions stated in the main body of the paper are relegated to an Appendix.
13value functions of workers and ﬁrms into the surplus sharing rule (10), which gives:
w
P (y,z) = φ(y + z) + (1 − φ)b + φ
 











P (y,z) − φ(c + f), (24)
w
T (y,z) = φ(y + z) + (1 − φ)b. (25)
Finally, we need to explicitly state how the stock of employment evolves over time.
Let ut denote the measure of unemployment, and nP
t and nT
t be the measure of per-
manent workers and temporary workers. Let’s begin by deriving the law of motion of
the stock of permanent workers, which is given by the sum of three groups of work-
ers. First, unemployed workers and temporary workers can search and match with other
ﬁrms and become permanent workers. This happens with probability αw (θt) G (A). Sec-
ond, after the realization of the aggregate shock, the permanent worker remains at the








Third, some of temporary workers who cannot ﬁnd other jobs get promoted to per-
manent workers which adds to the aggregate employment pool for permanent workers
by (1 − αw (θt))






t . Notice that  G (A) = 1 − G(¯ z) and



































Unemployed workers and temporary workers who are unable to ﬁnd high-quality matches,











w (θt)G(¯ z). (27)
Since the aggregate population is normalized to unity, the mass of unemployed workers is
given by:





The standard deﬁnition of market tightness is slightly modiﬁed to account for the on-the-






3 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
To understand the intuition behind some of the results we show in the quantitative section,
we perform here some comparative statics in “partial” equilibrium, by which we mean
keeping θ constant. The goal is to understand how changes in selected variables impact
the hiring and ﬁring decisions.
Proposition 3 The hiring rule has the following properties:





d¯ z/dαw < 0 when φ < ¯ φ
d¯ z/dαw > 0 when φ > ¯ φ
,
3. d¯ z/dc < 0.
The intuition behind proposition 3 can be illustrated in Figures 1 to 3 . Figure 1
shows the eﬀects of an increase in the ﬁring cost f. This increase has two eﬀects on the
(net) value of a ﬁlled job.7 The direct eﬀect causes a drop in the value of a permanent job
because the ﬁrm has to pay more to separate from the worker. As a result the permanent
contract curve shifts downward. An increase in f also increases the job destruction rate
of temporary workers by raising the threshold value ¯ yR, lowering the value of a temporary
job. In equilibrium, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates resulting in fewer permanent contracts.
Increasing the job ﬁnding probability has an ambiguous eﬀect on the hiring decision
because it depends on the worker’s bargaining power. If it is easier for unemployed
workers to ﬁnd a job, the value of being unemployed increases because the unemployment
spell is shortened. This lowers the match surplus since the worker’s outside option rises.
Therefore, the value of ﬁlled jobs falls and (both permanent and temporary) contract
curves will shift outward. We call this the unemployment eﬀect. However, there are
7The size of the surplus determines the type of contract chosen or whether matches continue or are
destroyed. By Nash bargaining the value of a ﬁlled job is proportional to the total surplus, so it is suﬃcient
to compare the changes in the values of ﬁlled jobs to determine the eﬀects on the total surpluses.
15two additional eﬀects on temporary jobs. Since the temporary worker can search on-
the-job, the higher job ﬁnding probability increases the chance than a temporary worker
remains employed. Therefore, the match surplus will go up due to the rise in the value of
temporary employment. We call this eﬀect the job continuation eﬀect. For workers under
temporary contract, these two eﬀects exactly cancel out. On the other hand, the higher
job ﬁnding probability causes more separations of temporary contracts. This so-called
job turnover eﬀect will reduce the value of a temporary job which moves the temporary
contract curve outward. If a worker has more bargaining power, then the unemployment
eﬀect dominates the job turnover eﬀect. This case is depicted in Figure 1. However if the
worker’s bargaining power is small, the job turnover eﬀect dominates the unemployment
eﬀect which leads to fewer temporary workers. The latter case is shown in Figure 2.
Finally, the eﬀect of an increase in promotion costs is depicted in Figure 3. As pro-
motion costs aﬀect only the value of a temporary contract, an increase in c reduces the
incentive for promoting a temporary worker. As a result, the value of a temporary job
decreases and the temporary contract curve shifts downward.










Figure 1: Eﬀect of Firing Costs on Temporary Contracts
Proposition 4 If the ﬁrm has most of the bargaining power, the job destruction rule has
the following properties:










Figure 2: Eﬀect of Job-Finding Probability on Temporary Contracts







Figure 3: Eﬀects of Promotion Costs on Temporary Contracts
1. dyP/df < 0 and dyR/df > 0,
2. dyP/dαw > 0 and dyR/dαw > 0.
173. yP is weakly increasing in c and dyR/dc > 0.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 states that the ﬁring cost has opposite eﬀects on the
separation of permanent jobs and temporary jobs. An increase in the ﬁring cost induces
the ﬁrm to be less willing to pay the cost to ﬁre a permanent worker. However, it makes
the ﬁrm more willing to separate from a temporary worker now, in order to avoid paying
the higher ﬁring cost in the future. The second part of the proposition results mainly from
changing the hiring threshold. The last part is straightforward: an increase in promotion
costs discourages the ﬁrm to retain the temporary worker.
Finally, we can take the hiring and ﬁring decisions as given and ask how changes in
the ﬁring cost and promotion cost aﬀect the job creation (vacancy posting) decision. The
following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 5 Given the hiring and permanent job destruction rules, i.e. ¯ z and yP (z)
are ﬁxed, dθ/df < 0 if β is not too small and dθ/dc < 0.
The explanation of this proposition is that an increase in ﬁring costs and promotion
costs discourages the ﬁrm to post more vacancies by reducing the expected proﬁts of jobs.
4 Data
We used the Workplace and Employee Survey, a Canadian matched employer-employee
dataset collected by Statistics Canada. It is an annual, longitudinal survey at the estab-
lishment level, targeting establishments in Canada that have paid employees in March,
with the exceptions of those operating in the crop and animal production; ﬁshing, hunting
and trapping; households’, religious organizations, and the government sectors. In 1999,
it consisted of a sample of 6,322 establishments drawn from the Business Register main-
tained by Statistics Canada and the sample has been followed ever since. Every odd year
the sample has been augmented with newborn establishments that have become part of
the Business Register. The data are rich enough to allow us to distinguish employees by
the type of contract they hold. However, only a sample of employees is surveyed from each
establishment. 8 The average number of employees in the sample is roughly 20,000 each
year. Workers are followed for two years and provide responses on hours worked, earn-
ings, job history, education, and demographic information. Firms provide information
8All establishments with less than four employees are surveyed. In larger establishments, a sample of
workers is surveyed, with a maximum of 24 employees per given establishment.
18about hiring conditions of diﬀerent workers, payroll and other compensation, vacancies,
and separation of workers.
Given the theory laid out above, it is important that the deﬁnition of temporary worker
in the data matches as close as possible the concept of a temporary worker in the model.
In principle, it is unclear that all establishments share the idea of what a temporary worker
is when they respond to the survey: it could be a seasonal worker, a ﬁxed-term consultant
hired for a project or a worker working under a contract with a set termination date. As a
result, Statistics Canada implemented some methodological changes to be consistent in its
deﬁnition of a temporary worker. This aﬀected the incidence of temporary employment
in the survey forcing us to use data only from 2001 onwards. The deﬁnition of temporary
workers we use, it is of those receiving a T-4 slip from an employer but who have a set
termination date. For instance, workers from temporary employment agents or other
independent contractors are not included in our deﬁnition. With the use of this deﬁnition
the fraction of temporary workers among all workers is 14%.
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics on workers’ compensation by type of con-
tract held. All quantities are in Canadian dollars and we use three diﬀerent measures
of compensation: total earnings reported by the employee, hourly wages with reported
extra-earnings, and hourly wages without the reported extra earnings. According to the
three measures, permanent workers earn more but they do work more as well. As a re-
sult, while total earnings of permanent workers are roughly double of those earned by
temporary workers, when converted to hourly measures, that ratio drops to 1.14-1.15.
The cross-sectional distribution of wages per hour has a larger variance in the case of
temporary workers than of permanent workers. The standard deviation of permanent
workers’ hourly wages is about half of mean hourly wages. This ratio rises to 81% for
temporary workers.
In Canada, job turnover is higher for temporary workers than for permanent workers,
as extensively documented by Cao and Leung (2010). We reproduce some of their turnover
statistics on Table 2. As it is typical, we measure turnover by comparing job creation
and job destruction rates. If we denote by EMPt,i the total level of employment at time








19Table 1: Worker’s Compensation by Type of Contract
Mean Standard Deviation
Permanent
Real Earnings $21,847 $33,525
Real Hourly Wage (No Extra) $21.43 $11.75
Real Hourly Wage $22.57 $14.40
Temporary
Real Earnings $9,737 $26,469
Real Hourly Wage (No Extra) $18.87 $15.22
Real Hourly Wage $19.54 $18.85







if Empt+1,i − Empt,i < 0 and 0 otherwise.
Given the emphasis of our work on a labor market segmented by temporary and
permanent workers, we use the previous expressions to provide measures of job destruction
and creation by the type of contract held. However, we measure creation and destruction
of temporary (or permanent) workers relative to the average total employment level. In
other words, we measure the change in the stock of workers by contract type relative to
the stock of total employment. These rates are given on the ﬁrst two lines of Table 2. The
job destruction rates are 6.2% for permanent workers and 6.4% for temporary workers.
The creation rates are 8.4% and 5.4%. As the fraction of temporary workers is only 14%
of the workforce, these rates point to a much higher degree of turnover for temporary
workers.
The reader might have noticed that the sum of the destruction rates for temporary
and permanent workers is not equal to the destruction rate for all workers. The same can
be said for the creation rate. The reason is that establishments can change the number of
temporary and permanent workers without altering the stock of all workers. If we restrict
20Table 2: Job Creation and Job Destruction (%)
Conventional Deﬁnition
All Workers Permanent Temporary
Job Creation 10.2 8.1 5.3
Job Destruction 9.2 6.4 11.5
Alternative Deﬁnition
All Workers Permanent Temporary
Job Creation 8.3 5.2 3.1
Job Destruction 7.1 4.1 3.0
the sample to those establishments that increase or decrease the stock of both permanent
and temporary workers, the rates for all workers are the sum of the rates of the two types
of workers. These measures are reported in Table 2 under the “Alternative Deﬁnition”
cell. Turnover decreases under this alternative deﬁnition, with creation and destruction
rates for all workers that are 2% lower than using the conventional deﬁnition. The total
job creation rate is 8.3% and the job destruction rate is 7.1%.
5 Model Estimation
Our goal is to use our theory to understand patterns of inequality as they relate to
employment contracts. More speciﬁcally, we want to assess how changes in ﬁring policies
aﬀect inequality in wages and this goal demands our theory to be parameterized in a
reasonable manner. This section describes the mapping between theory and data, goes
over some technicalities of this mapping and shows its results.
Obtaining a solution for the model requires specifying parametric distributions for
G(z) and F(y).9 We assume that y is drawn from a log-normal distribution and z from
a uniform distribution. In the model the overall scale of the economy in indeterminate
and shifts in the mean of y plus z will have no impact. Consequently, we normalize the
mean of y plus z to one, reducing the dimension of the parameter vector of interest. One
needs a functional form for the matching technology as well. Denote by B the level of
matches given vacancies v and searching workers nS = nT + u. We assume that matches
9The reader can ﬁnd much technical detail about our solution and estimation algorithms in a Technical
Appendix








This choice of technology for the matching process implies the following job-ﬁnding and
















Having speciﬁed parametric forms for G, F, and the matching technology we are now
ready to describe our procedure in detail. Let γ = (f,b,φ,ξ,k, y, z,σy) be the vector
of structural parameters that we need to estimate where  x and σx denote the mean and
the standard deviation for a random variable x.10 and The literature estimating search
models is large and much of it has followed full-information estimation methodologies,
maximizing a likelihood function of histories of workers.11 These workers face exogenous
arrival rates of job oﬀers (both on and oﬀ-the-job) and choose to accept or reject such
oﬀers. Parameters maximize the likelihood of observing workers’ histories conditional on
the model’s decision rules. In this paper, we depart from this literature by choosing a
partial information approach to estimating our model. Our reason is twofold. First, our
search model is an equilibrium one; the arrival rates of job oﬀers are the result of aggregate
behavior from the part of consumers and ﬁrms. Second, the lack of a panel dimension
of the WES does not allow us to perform a maximum likelihood estimation. For these
reasons, we take a partial-information route and estimate the model by combining indirect
inference and simulated method of moments.
The ﬁrst step involves choosing a set of empirical moments; set with a dimension
at least as large as the parameter vector of interest. We estimate the parameters by
minimizing a quadratic function of the deviations of those empirical moments from their
10Parameters c, β, and σz, should be included in the vector γ. We ﬁx β to be 0.96 and c to be 1% of
the ﬁring cost f. The standard deviation of z, by our assumption of a uniform distribution, is given by
knowing the µz and the normalization that E(y) + E(z) = 1.
11The list is far from being exhaustive but it includes Cahuc et al. (2006), Finn and Mabli (2009),
Bontemps et al. (1999), Eckstein and Wolpin (1990). The reader is referred to Eckstein and Van den
Berg (2007) for a survey of the literature that includes many more examples.
22model-simulated counterparts. Formally,




where ˆ γ denotes the point estimate for γ, W is a weighting matrix, and M is a column
vector whose k-th element denotes a deviation of an empirical moment and a model-
simulated moment. The vector YT describes time series data - of length T - from which we
compute the empirical moments. The above expression should be familiar to readers, as it
is a standard statistical criterion function in the method-of-moments or GMM literatures.
Traditional estimation techniques rely on minimizing the criterion function (30) and using
the Hessian matrix evaluated at the minimized value to compute standard errors. In many
instances equation (30) is non-smooth, locally ﬂat, and have several local minima. For
these reasons, we use the quasi-Bayesian Laplace Type Estimator (LTE) proposed by
Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). They show that under some technical assumptions, a
transformation of (30) is a proper density function (in their language, a quasi-posterior
density function) As a result, they show how moments of interest can be computed using
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques by sampling from that quasi-
posterior density. We describe our estimation technique in more detail in the technical
appendix, but MCMC essentially amounts to constructing a Markov chain that converges
to the density function implied by a transformation of (30). Draws from that Markov
Chain are draws from the quasi-posterior, and as a result, moments of the parameter vector
such as means, standard deviations, or othe quantities of interest are readily available.
An important aspect of the estimation procedure is the choice of the weighting matrix
W. We post-pone a description of how we weight the diﬀerent moments and we now turn
to describe the moments themselves.
Indirect inference involves positing an auxiliary - reduced-form - model which links
actual data and model-simulated data. Given our focus on wage inequality, the auxiliary
model we chose is a wage regression that links wages, productivity, and the type of contract
held. Before being more speciﬁc about this regression let us ﬁrst discuss an identiﬁcation
assumption needed to estimate it. An important element in our model’s solution are
wages by type of contract which are given by equations (23)-(25). Irrespective of the type
of contract wages are always a function of a worker’s productivity y + z. In the data,
such productivity is unobserved; one observes an establishment’s total productivity or
the productivity for the entire sample. To overcome this diﬃculty we assume that the
23time-varying component of productivity y is ﬁrm or establishment-speciﬁc. Consequently,
diﬀerences among workers’ wages within a ﬁrm will be the result of working under a
diﬀerent contract or of having a diﬀerent match-speciﬁc quality. We then posit that a
wage of worker i of ﬁrm j at time t is given by:
wijt = β + βALPALPjt + βTypeχijt + ǫijt (31)
where ALPjt is an establishment’s average labor productivity - output divided by
total hours - and χijt is an indicator variable describing a worker’s temporary status.
This is the equation we estimate from the data.12 A panel of values for ALPjt is easy to
obtain, as we have observations on the number of workers and the amount of output per
establishment. Note that variations over time in ALPjt arise from changes in the time-
varying productivity shock but also from the matches and separations that occur within
a establishment over time. If as a result of turnover within a establishment, the mix of
workers changes- there are more temporary workers in some year, for instance- the average
worker productivity will change, even without a change in yjt. Let us now describe what
is the analogous equation to (31) we estimate in our model-simulated data. Our theory is
silent about ﬁrms or establishments; there are only matches of which one can reasonably
speak. Note, however, that ALPjt is the sum of the time-varying component yjt plus an
expectation of the match-speciﬁc productivity z at time t - assuming a large number of
workers per establishment. Hence, we simulate a large number of values of y, z, and wages
by contract type and regress the logarithm of wages on a constant, the logarithm of the
sum of y and the mean simulated z and the contract type. Disturbances in this regression
will be interpreted as deviations of the match-speciﬁc quality for a given match relative
to its mean match-speciﬁc value (plus some small degree of simulation error).
Our sample of the WES dataset covers the years 2001 to 2006. We estimate equation
(31) for each year which yields a series of estimates (β,βALP,βType,σǫ). Returning to
our criterion function (30), the ﬁrst two moments we choose to match are the time-series
average of the coeﬃcients βALP and βType. For the remaining moments, we choose to
include in our vector of moments time-series averages of job-creation and job-destruction
(for permanent workers, the job-ﬁnding probability, the fraction of temporary workers,
and the ratio of wages of permanent workers to those of temporary workers.13
12We take logarithms for wages and ALPjt as our model is stationary and displays no productivity
growth.
13We thank M. Zhang for sharing her data on the Canadian job-ﬁnding rate used in Zhang (2008).
















Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the time series of the moments
chosen in our estimation. The deviations of the empirical sample averages from their
model counterparts comprise the vector M. Following much of the GMM literature, we
weight elements of M according to the inverse of the covariance matrix of the deviations
of the time series shown in Table 3 from their model equivalents.
6 Results
Table 4 shows the estimated parameter values along with their standard errors. The
point estimates are the quasi-posterior means and the standard errors are the quasi-
posterior standard deviations.14 We estimate a bargaining power of workers φ equal to
0.17. This is smaller than values assigned in many calibrated studies but larger than
empirical estimates such as Cahuc et al. (2006), who ﬁnd values very close to zero.
The estimation yields distributions for y and z whose means are far apart. Given our
parametric assumptions E(y) = e y+0.5σ2
y = 1.47 while the mean of the match-speciﬁc
shock z is -0.47. These estimated parameters imply moments that we report on the ﬁrst
column of Table 5. The second column of the table reports the equivalent empirical
moments. The ﬁt is satisfactory: only one moment is signiﬁcantly oﬀ its empirical value
14These results are based on 4000 draws of the Markov chain.









 y 0.375 0.015
- the fraction of temporary workers. The reader should bear in mind that the fraction
of temporary workers from the workers’ survey is smaller than the number reported in
the establishment survey. In the latter the number is the 14% we use as the actual
empirical value, but in the workers’ survey the number is much smaller; about 5%. The
unemployment rate is perhaps another moment in which the model does not give a good
ﬁt. It is somewhat diﬃcult to get it to be below 10%.
How do ﬁring costs aﬀect the wage distribution? The model delivers two endogenous
objects that are functions of the ﬁring costs and can aﬀect the shape of the wage distri-
bution: ﬁrst, a diﬀerent level of wages for each of the two diﬀerent contracts, and second
a fraction of workers under temporary contracts. We perform the experiment of tripling
the level of ﬁring costs from the estimated value of f = 0.177. Table 6 reports the result
from this experiment. The ﬁrst and the last column of that table show the same numbers
as Table 5. The middle column shows the results for the economy with triple the level of
ﬁring costs. Increasing f has a modest eﬀect in all moments except obviously the share
of wages that the ﬁrm has to pays as a ﬁring tax.
As intuition would suggest, creation and destruction of permanent matches drop. The
function Y P(z) shifts downward (i.e. falls for every value of z) and the function Y R(z)
shifts upward. As a result there are fewer promotions of temporary workers and fewer dis-
missals of permanent workers. The majority of workers work under permanent contracts,
which causes the aggregate turnover measures to drop as well. The total destruction
rate falls from 10.6% to 8.3% and aggregate creation rate falls from 11% to 8.7%. In
relative terms creation falls less, increasing the stock of employed workers and decreasing
the unemployment rate from 10.6% to 8.9%. In light of these results it seems puzzling
that turnover measures for temporary workers fall as well. The reason is the measure of
creation and destruction we use. The mass of new created temporary jobs rises because ¯ z















drops. But the creation rate is deﬁned as the temporary jobs created divided by total em-
ployment. Total employment rises more than new temporary jobs generating the decline
in the creation rate. Similar reasoning explains the fall in the job destruction rate. Recall
that Y R(z) shifts upward, causing the hazard rate of losing one’s temporary job when
one faces the promotion decision, to rise. This increase is what intuition would suggest.
Since the destruction rate of temporary contracts takes into account the total stock of
employment, it can fall even with Y R(z) rising.
What is the contribution of the “search externality” in explaining these results? To
eliminate the search externality we ﬁx the labor market tightness θ to the value obtained
under the estimated parameters.15 We then triple the ﬁring costs. Fixing θ clearly
ﬁxes the job-ﬁnding and job-ﬁlling probabilities; these do not take into account the ﬂows
in and out of unemployment, the permanent workers pool or the temporary workers
pool. Table 7 displays four columns of numbers. The ﬁrst, second, and fourth columns
correspond to three columns shown in Table 6. The third column reports the results
for the model-implied moments of tripling the ﬁring costs and keeping θ ﬁxed. There are
several large diﬀerences relative to the case in which θ can adjust. First, turnover measures
increase (when compared to the low f case). In particular, destruction and creation of
permanent jobs rises. The higher destruction of permanent jobs can be explained by
Proposition 4. It states that if the ﬁrm has most of the bargaining power (φ → 0) the
function Y P(z) falls when f rises. In our case, although φ is not large compared to
15Fixing θ is what we labeled “partial equilibrium” in section 3.
27Table 6: Increasing Firing Costs
f = 0.177 f = 3(0.177) Data
JD 0.106 0.083 0.092
JC 0.110 0.087 0.102
JDP 0.105 0.081 0.064
JDT 0.041 0.036 0.062
JCP 0.105 0.081 0.081
JCT 0.068 0.051 0.053
nT/(1 − u) 0.064 0.056 0.140
αw(θ) 0.920 0.891 0.919
f/wP 0.182 0.544 0.182
wP/wT 1.123 1.126 1.140
u 0.106 0.089 0.071
βAPL 0.174 0.174 0.159
βType 0.132 0.135 0.193
values typically used in calibrated models, it is suﬃciently far from zero to cause a rise
in Y P(z). This rise is responsible for the increase in the destruction rate of permanent
workers. The intuition comes from equation (13), which shows the value of the surplus
under a permanent contract. The last term in that expression is the option value of
unemployment. Note that when φ → 1, the ratio
φ
1−φ → ∞, increasing the option value
of unemployment. When we ﬁx θ the only elements that change in that option value
are f and  G(A). Everything else remains ﬁxed. If the ratio
φ
1−φ is large, an increase
in f makes that option value have an even larger negative contribution to the surplus,
implying that a small drop in y is enough to make the surplus negative. As a result the
function Y P(z) rises, increasing along the destruction rate for permanent workers. This
same option value appears in wages of the permanently employed which explains the rise
in the relative wage. The larger destruction rate of permanent workers implies a larger
share of temporary workers.
What are the implications of all this for the shape of the wage distribution? Figure 4
shows the wage distribution for the three cases discussed. The green line represents the
density function of wages (using standard kernel-smoothing methods) when the param-
eters are set to their quasi-posterior means. If we increase the level of ﬁring costs and
do not take into account the search externalities, the result is the red line: higher mean
wages, because of the rise in the wages of the permanent workers and a larger fraction of
temporary workers (the hump in the distribution between the values of 0.8 and 0.9). The
standard deviation of wages rises more than 10% and the wage of the average permanent
28Table 7: Inequality: Eﬀect of Search Externalities
f = 0.177 f = 3(0.177) f = 3(0.177) Data
(θ adjusts) (θ ﬁxed)
JD 0.106 0.083 0.125 0.092
JC 0.110 0.087 0.130 0.102
JDP 0.105 0.081 0.12 0.064
JDT 0.041 0.036 0.068 0.062
JCP 0.105 0.081 0.120 0.081
JCT 0.068 0.051 0.062 0.053
nT/(1 − u) 0.064 0.056 0.130 0.140
αw(θ) 0.920 0.891 0.920 0.919
f/wP 0.182 0.544 0.533 0.182
wP/wT 1.123 1.126 1.150 1.140
u 0.106 0.089 0.124 0.071
βAPL 0.174 0.174 0.173 0.159
βType 0.132 0.135 0.154 0.193
worker rises relative to the ratio of the average temporary worker. When θ is permitted to
adjust, the eﬀects on inequality vanish. There is still a larger option value of unemploy-
ment which slightly increases the relative wages of permanent versus temporary workers,
but as the fraction of temporary workers falls, inequality remains essentially the same.
7 Concluding Remarks
This study provides a theory of the co-existence of labor contracts with diﬀerent ﬁring
conditions. Consistent with empirical evidence that points to employers choosing among
contracts with diﬀerent degrees of labor protection, ﬁrms here choose to oﬀer ex-ante
identical workers diﬀerent contracts, and as a result, diﬀerent wages. The reason is match-
quality that varies among worker-ﬁrm pairs and that is revealed at the moment ﬁrms and
workers meet. Firms oﬀer permanent contracts to “good” matches, as they risk losing
the worker should they oﬀer them a temporary contract. This risk results from the
diﬀerent on-the-job search behavior by the two types of workers: temporary workers search
while permanent workers do not. Not-so-good matches are given a temporary contract
under which they work for a lower wage but they are allowed to search for alternative
opportunities. After one period, temporary workers have to be dismissed or promoted to
permanent status.
The existence of search and matching frictions implies that workers might work tem-


















Figure 4: Eﬀects of Promotion Costs on Temporary Contracts
porarily in jobs with an inferior match quality, before transferring to better - and more
stable - matches. Our assumption of including a time-varying component in the total
productivity of a worker allows our environment to generate endogenous destruction rates
that diﬀer by type of contract. Our environment is simple enough to deliver several ana-
lytical results regarding cut-oﬀ rules for the type of relationship ﬁrms and workers begin
and when and how they separate. Yet, it is rich in its implications.
One of these implications is that we can examine wage inequality from a diﬀerent
perspective. To what extent do ﬁring costs help shape the wage distribution? We show
that the answer to this question depends (greatly) on whether we take into account or
not search externalities. If ﬂows into and out of unemployment change the probabilities
of ﬁnding a job or ﬁlling a vacancy that workers or ﬁrms face, the results are likely to
be small. If those ﬂows do not change the job-ﬁnding and ﬁlling rates, the impact on
inequality of rising ﬁring costs can be sizable.
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32A Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (13) can be written as
S








k + βαf (θ) G (A)f
 
(1 − φ)αf (θ)
. (32)
From the fact that ∂SP/∂y = 1 and ∂2SP/∂y∂z = 0, it implies that SP (y,z) = y+ϕ(z).




P (x,z)dF (x) =
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x + ϕ(z)dF (x),






For any z ∈ Z, SP  
yP,z
 
= 0 implies yP = −ϕ(z). Substitute ϕ(z) with −yP, the




P (x,z)dF (x) =
  ymax
yP
[1 − F (x)]dx. (33)
To pin down yP, we need to solve the equation SP (yp,z) = 0, thus
y
P + z + β
  ymax
yP
[1 − F (x)]dx = b +
φαw (θ)
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w (θ) G (A)f) − (1 − β)f. (34)
Denote left-hand side by Φz (y) and right-hand side by Φ(θ). Notice that Φ(θ) is increas-








w (θmax)f) − (1 − β)f.
33Φz (y) is increasing in y and z. If inequalities (16) and (17) holds then for given θ and z,
we must have
Φz (ymin) ≤ Φzmax (ymin) < Φ(θ) < Φzmin (ymax) ≤ Φz (ymax).
We can conclude there is a unique solution yP (z) ∈ (ymin,ymax) for equation (34) by the
intermediate value theorem. That is, yP (z) exists for any z ∈ [zmin,zmax].
Similarly, equation (14) can be rewritten as
S
R (y,z) = y + z + β
  ymax
yP
[1 − F (x)]dx − c − βf − b −
φαw (θ)
 
k + βαf (θ) G (A)f
 
(1 − φ)αf (θ)
.
(35)
Following the same argument for the condition SP  
yP,z
 
= 0, the above equation
yields the cut-oﬀ value by solving:
y
R + z + β
  ymax
yP
[1 − F (x)]dx = b +
φαw (θ)
 
k + βαf (θ) G (A)f
 
(1 − φ)αf (θ)
+ c + βf. (36)
Comparing equations (34) and (36), we get
y
R = y
P + c + f.
Then assumption 2 guarantees the existence of yP ∈ (ymin,ymax − c − f) which implies
yR < ymax exists as well.
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1. EyJP (y,z) and EyJT (y,z) are both strictly increasing
in z. From the surplus sharing rule, it is suﬃcient to show that SP (y,z) and ST (y,z) are
strictly increasing in z. Substitute equation (33) into (32), we obtain
S
P (y,z) = y+z+β
  ymax
yP(z)
[1 − F (x)]dF (x)+(1 − β)f−b−
φαw (θ)
 
k + βαf (θ) G (A)f
 
(1 − φ)αf (θ)
.
(37)
34Take the derivative of SP with respect to z, we get
∂SP (y,z)
∂z













1 − β (1 − F (yP))
< 0. (39)
Plug (39) into (38), we get ∂SP/∂z > 0. Similarly, the total surplus of a temporary
contract can be rewritten as
S




[1 − F (x)]dx − b. (40)
The derivative of ST with respect to z is given by
∂ST (y,z)
∂z










Step 2. EyJP (y,z) and EyJT (y,z) are strictly convex. By the separability of y and
z, it suﬃces to prove that SP and STare convex in z. Twice diﬀerentiate SP with respect
























yP   2 < 0 and F ′ > 0, it must be the case that
∂2SP (y,z)/∂z2 > 0. Similarly, ∂2ST (y,z)/∂z2 > 0.
These two steps guarantee that if EyJP (y,z) = EyJT (y,z) holds, the cut-oﬀ value z
is unique. The last step is to verify the single crossing property. That is, if
EyJ
P (y,zmin) < EyJ
T (y,zmin),
EyJ
P (y,zmax) > EyJ
T (y,zmax)
35hold, then the cut-oﬀ value ¯ z exists. Denote
∆θ (z) =









































w (θ) G (A)f).
The inequality (21) implies that for any θ ∈ [θmin,θmax],
Γ(zmin,θ) ≤ Γ(zmin,θmax) < Λ(θmin) ≤ Λ(θ).
While the inequality (22) implies that for any θ,
Λ(θ) ≤ Λ(θmax) < Γ(zmax,θmin) ≤ Γ(zmax,θ).
Thus, ∆θ (zmin) < 0 < ∆θ (zmax) for all θ ∈ [θmin,θmax]. Figure 5 shows the single crossing
property.
Proof of Proposition 3. The equilibrium condition for ¯ z is EyJP (y, ¯ z) = EyJT (y, ¯ z).













k + βαf (θ)(1 − G(¯ z))f
 
(1 − φ)αf (θ)




(1 − F (x))dx = 0 (41)
36zmin ¯ z zmax
EyJP(y,z)
EyJT(y,z)
Figure 5: Permanent Contract vs. Temporary Contract
where ¯ yP ≡ yP (¯ z) and ¯ yR ≡ yR (¯ z) = ¯ yP + c + f. From equation (19), we have
¯ y
P + ¯ z + β
  ymax
¯ yP




k + βαf (θ)(1 − G(¯ z))f
 
(1 − φ)αf (θ)
= 0. (42)
Denote the left hand sides of equations (41) and (42) by Π
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1−φ − (1 − β)
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−
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k + βαf (1 − G(¯ z))f
 
  ymax






















The determinant of matrix D(¯ yP,¯ z)Π is
   D(¯ yP,¯ z)Π
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− (1 − β)
 











wβ (1 − G(¯ z))
 
.
38Observe that the numerator (a1 + a2) is decreasing in φ. When φ = 0, the numerator
becomes
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.




¯ yP  
and 1 − F
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¯ yR
















¯ yP     ymax
¯ yR (1 − F (x))dx >





dαw < 0 when φ < ¯ φ
d¯ z









¯ yP   




¯ yR  
 








1 − β −
φ
1−φαwβ (1 − G(¯ z)) +
φ
1−φαwβfG′ (¯ z) d¯ z
df












1−φαwβfG′(¯ z) d¯ z
dαw









1 − β (1 − F (¯ yP))
→ 0
+.











(1 − G(¯ z)) − fG′ (¯ z) d¯ z
df
 










1−φαwβfG′(¯ z) d¯ z
dc
1 − β (1 − F (¯ yP))
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The job creation rule is obtained by equation (11). Substitute
equations (13) and (15), we get
E (y + z) − b + (1 − β)(1 − G(¯ z))f
−
β + φαw (θ)(1 − G(¯ z))
(1 − φ)βαf (θ)
 
k + βf (1 − G(¯ z))α
f (θ)
 
+ β (1 − α
w (θ))










(1 − F (x))dxdz = 0 (43)
Denote the left hand side of equation (43) by h and diﬀerentiate it with respect to θ, f













φ(1 − G(¯ z))αfαw′ − [β + φαw (θ)(1 − G(¯ z))]αf′ 
(1 − φ)β (αf)
2
−
β + φαw (1 − G(¯ z))
(1 − φ)
(1 − G(¯ z))α
w′
< 0,
due to αw′(θ) > 0 and αf′(θ) < 0,
∂h
∂f
= (1 − β)(1 − G(¯ z)) −
β + φαw (1 − G(¯ z))
(1 − φ)
(1 − G(¯ z))
−β (1 − α
w)



















= −β (1 − α
w)
















41B Model Solution and Estimation
This section describes some technical aspects of the solution and estimation algorithms
that produce the results shown in section 6. The model described can be deﬁned as a
function Ξ : Γ → ˜ Y , where γ ∈ Γ ⊂ Rnγ , and ˜ y ∈ ˜ Y ⊂ RnM. An element in the
set ˜ Y can be thought of an endogenous variable (e.g. the unemployment rate) that is
an outcome of the model. The estimation procedure uses a statistical criterion function
that minimizes the deviations of model-implied moments - weighted appropriately - from
empirical moments.
Empirical moments are given by the means of time series that have a model-implied




T } deﬁne the vector MnM×1 as having typical element mj = (˜ y(γ)− ¯ Y
j
T) with




t=1 yt. We construct the statistical criterion function,
H(γ,YT) = M(γ,YT)
′W(γ,YT)M(γ,YT) (44)
We sensibly choose the matrix W(γ,YT) to be the inverse of the covariance matrix
of YT. In our application nM = 13 and nγ = 8, since the parameter vector of interest is
given by γ = (f,b,φ,ξ,k, y, z,σy). In principle one can obtain an estimate of γ by:
ˆ γ = argmin
γ
H(γ,YT).
Minimizing the function H(γ,YT) by means of standard minimization routines e.g.
any optimizer in the family of Newton-type methods, is seldom an easy task. Problems
abound, and they include non-diﬀerentiabilities, ﬂat areas, and local minima. To obtain
estimates of γ we employ a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method (MCMC) that transforms






where π(γ) is a prior distribution (or weight function) over the parameter space.
This distribution can be uniform which implies a constant π(γ) and we assume so in
the estimation. Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) label p(γ,YT) a quasi-posterior density
because it is not a posterior density function in a true Bayesian sense; there is no updating.
It is, however, a proper density function with well-deﬁned moments and as a result we





In practice, the way we compute the quasi-posterior mean is by a Monte Carlo proce-
dure. Markov Chain Monte Carlo amounts to simulating a Markov Chain that converges
to the quasi-posterior distribution. Beginning with an initial guess for the parameter
42vector γ0, we iterate on the following algorithm:
1. Draw a candidate vector γi from a distribution q(γi|γi−1).
2. Compute eH(γi,YT).
3. If pA = eH(γi,YT )
eH(γi−1,YT ) ≥ 1, accept γi.
4. Else, accept γi with probability pA.
5. Set i ← i + 1 and return to Step 1.
Repeating these 5 steps and generating a long sequence of draws for γ yields a sample
of large size, hopefully drawn from the quasi posterior density p(γ,YT).16 Any moment
of interest (means, standard deviations, quantiles, etc...) can be readily computed. To
evaluate the function eH(γ,YT) one needs to solve for the model counterparts of the
empirical series in YT. For a given γi in the sequence of simulated draws, we obtain a
model solution using the following steps:
1. We begin with guesses for θ, and ¯ z.17
2. Find the surplus functions SP, SR and ST by substituting and combining equations
(13), (14), (15), (35), (37), and (40).
3. Update θ using equation (11). Using the functional form for the matching function

















dG(z)(1 − φ)β −
−βf G(A).
4. Update ¯ z by solving the two-equation system deﬁned by equations (41) and (42),
which solve for ¯ z and yP(¯ z).
5. Iterate on the previous two steps until the sequences of θ and ¯ z have converged.
16We used 5000 simulations and discarded the ﬁrst 1000.
17We hope it is clear to the reader the implicit dependence of these variables on γi.
436. Having obtained ¯ z and θ we can update the employment measures - both temporary





u + nT 
αw (θ)(1 − G(¯ z))
1 −
  zmax
zmin [1 − F (yP (z))]dG(z)
+
(1 − αw (θ))
















1 − αw (θ)G(¯ z)
.
All integrals throughout are evaluated using quadrature.18 With values for θ, ¯ z, nT, nP
(and clearly u as a byproduct), one can compute wages and simulate histories of workers
to ﬁt regression equation 31. In addition, it is easy to compute other moments. For
example, the destruction rate of temporary workers is given by:
JDT =
nT   ¯ z
zmin F(Y R(z))dG(z)
nT + nP
One can compute the remaining turnover measures in an analogous way.
18In particular, we use the Gauss-Kronrod integrator using the QDAG routine for Fortran provided in
the IMSL package.
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